INTRODUCTION
The goal of the free flight concept is to provide more flexibility for operators by reducing constraints within the airspace system. One means of reducing constraints is to allow for aircraft self-separation in certain environments (e.g., en-route airspace). New technologies are required for self-separation. These include enhancements to communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS), as well as improved conflict detection and resolution devices.
For the conflict detection and resolution system, two zones are defined around aircraft that serve as a buffer for collision protection: the protected zone and alert zone (ref.1). The protected zone is a representation of the current spatial operational separation standards that exist in the domestic en-route airspace. The protected zone, therefore, is expected to remain free of other aircraft. The alert zone is a larger spatial or time based zone around the protected zone in which conflict alerts are issued to the pilot. This principle is visualized in figure 1. The National Aerospace Laboratory NLR has been conducting research for NASA, the FAA and the RLD (the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority) on the human factors of Free Flight since 1996. The following studies have been performed since 1996 on Airborne Separation Assurance:
 Conceptual design and off-line validation  Safety analysis  1997 Flight Simulator experiment  Cost/benefit analysis  Avionics requirements study  Critical conflict geometry study  1998 Flight Simulator experiment
The implementation defined by the conceptual design and the safety analysis was tested in a human-in-theloop simulation experiment in 1997. The goal of this experiment was to determine the human factors issues of operating an aircraft in a future free flight environment with airborne separation assurance. For this reason, an extreme version of airborne separation assurance was chosen: no Air Traffic Control (ATC) and full responsibility for traffic separation with the aircrew on board the aircraft. Before the 1997 human-in-the-loop experiment could be executed in NLR's Research Flight Simulator (RFS), the conceptual design study was performed to determine a possible free flight concept. Although the RTCA Task Force 3 document (ref.1) gives a definition of free flight, this definition is not sufficiently detailed for research purposes. The goal of this first study was to determine a possible free flight concept and develop it to a level of detail that could be implemented in the simulation environment. The main result from this study, in which several concepts were examined, was the choice and implementation of the modified voltage potential theory (ref.2) . The safety analysis, using the safety analysis tool TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer), showed that the developed free flight concept was at least as safe as the present day Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment, see ref.3.
In the human-in-the-loop experiment the traffic density, the level of automation (resolution activation) and nominal/non-nominal conditions were varied as independent variables. The traffic densities used in the experiment were one, two and three times the current mean Western-European traffic density. Three levels of automation were used for resolution activation via the autopilot. Combinations of traffic densities and levels of automation were all tested in nominal and non-nominal conditions. The non-nominal conditions consisted of other aircraft system failures, own aircraft system failures and increased delay times in conflict detection and resolution. All aircraft in the scenario were assumed to be equipped with Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B) equipment and Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS) equipment consisting of Conflict Detection and Resolution (CD&R) algorithms, Cockpit Displays of Traffic Information (CDTI) and ASAS alerting. Air traffic was monitored by Air Traffic Arbitration (ATA), replacing ATC on the ground, to assure co-operative behavior. All aircraft flew direct routes from origin to destination and only upper airspace was considered.
The aircrews participating in the experiment were given the new and extra task of traffic separation assurance, in a traffic environment up to three times as dense as today, with new displays and display features, new procedures, new cockpit automation and without extensive training. Therefore, the hypothesis was that the concept would be rated less than acceptable, less safe than today's ATM environment and that workload would increase significantly. Subjective data showed an acceptability rating of 80%. Around 75% of the runs were perceived by the pilots to be as safe or safer than today's ATM environment and workload was not rated significantly higher in cruise conditions than in today's ATM environment. These figures included triple density scenarios and non-nominal conditions. The objective data showed a significant increase of conflict times in non-nominal conditions, caused by other traffic not always maneuvering co-operatively during non-nominal conditions or own aircraft conflict detection and/or resolution was failed. The eye-point-of-gaze data showed that fixation duration on the Lateral Navigation Display (LND) was around 50%. This is higher than in today's cruise operation and could therefore be of concern. However, it is not clear whether these high fixation durations are required to operate in this concept. The measured intrusions of the protected zone were all grazes due to sudden maneuvering by aircraft close by the subject aircraft.
The overall conclusion of the 1997 Human-in-the-loop simulation experiment was that the feasibility of the given airborne separation assurance concept for a future free flight environment could not be refuted, see also ref.4. Both results from the simulation experiment and the results from the separate safety analysis (ref.
3) could not reject this conclusion. Out of the many issues raised during the experiment, the main issue was that means should be provided to prevent short term intrusions of protected zones due to sudden maneuvers of proximate aircraft.
Given the results of the 1997 simulation experiment, it can be concluded that airborne separation assurance seems feasible in Free Flight Airspace (FFAS) that is, airspace in which all aircraft are ASAS equipped and pilots have the responsibility for separation assurance. Other research confirms this, ref. 5, 6 . The major open research questions concern the design of the future ATM system containing Free Flight elements and the transition towards Free Flight.
Some general questions regarding a future ATM system with Free Flight elements are still to be answered: Taking the Eurocontrol figure into account, one can distinguish two transitions to Free Flight:
1. Transition in time, a certain period (potentially twenty years or more) in which aircraft are being equipped and the transition in time from the current ATM system with only Managed Airspace and Unmanaged Airspace to a future ATM system with Managed Airspace (MAS), Unmanaged Airspace (UAS) and Free Flight Airspace (FFAS) is taking place. This period includes the introduction of FFAS.
2. Transition in space, one aircraft transitioning from Managed Airspace (MAS) to Free Flight Airspace (FFAS) and vice versa. This transition will always be there, even when the future ATM system with FFAS is in place.
Major research questions concerning the transition in time are:
 How to cope with a mixed equipped scenario where part of the fleet is ASAS equipped and another part is not ?  Will the fleet eventually all be equipped or will a part of the fleet remain unequipped (e.g. general aviation) ?  How to stimulate equipping the fleet other than by regulatory requirement ?
Major research questions concerning the transition in space are:
 What is the role and responsibility of the ground controller and pilot ?  What will the operating procedure be to transition to/from FFAS ?
The aim of the 1998 human-in-the-loop experiment was to explore the human factors issues of several solutions of the future ATM system, covering all research questions raised. The transition towards Free Flight in time is reflected by the percentage of equipped aircraft in the traffic scenarios used in the experiment (25% and 75%). The transition to Free Flight Airspace (in space) was studied using different ATM operational concepts or scenarios, especially designed for this study. During the 1998 experiment, the results from the 1997 experiment and the subsequent cost/benefit analysis, ref.8, were taken into account as well.
The main adjustment to the ASAS equipment was the introduction of Predictive ASAS (PASAS), a system to prevent separation violation due to sudden maneuvers of nearby aircraft. The main result of the cost/benefit analysis was that vertical maneuvers are the most efficient maneuvers to use, whereas the 1997 human-inthe-loop experiment showed a clear preference for horizontal resolution maneuvers. This observation led to explicitly training the pilots in the 1998 human-in-theloop experiment to use vertical resolutions if possible.
The remainder of this paper will describe the 1998 human-in-the-loop simulation experiment conducted at NLR and discuss both subjective and objective results obtained from this experiment.
METHOD
The 1998 human-in-the-loop simulation experiment was an integrated air-ground set of trials, which investigated various future ATM concepts containing Free Flight elements. The experiment contained an air (flightdeck) and ground side (ATC) which shared traffic scenarios, thereby enabling direct comparison of results. This paper describes the airborne part of the experiment which primarily addressed how to accommodate mixed equipage in a transitional free flight era. Three different mixed equipage ATM concepts were tested, two mixed equipage levels of the aircraft and two traffic densities. The following outlines the method.
PARTICIPANTS
Eight subject pilots from major European airlines participated in the NLR 1998 human-in-the-loop Free Flight with Airborne Separation Assurance experiment. The subject pilot was asked to act as the captain (PilotNon-Flying, PNF), but to leave the control of the Mode Control Panel and the Flight Management System to the First Officer (Pilot-Flying, PF). The First Officer was a pilot hired by the NLR who was instructed to behave passively and not to influence the subject pilot. The subject pilot was instructed that the task of traffic awareness was his/hers alone.
AIRBORNE SEPARATION ASSURANCE SYSTEM
The Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS) consists of:
These elements of ASAS will be described in more detail below.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B) system is considered to be element of the ASAS equipment. Equipped aircraft will have ADS-B but are also able to receive Traffic Information ServicesBroadcast (TIS-B) information. The TIS-B information is assumed to contain similar data as the ADS-B information, in the same format as ADS-B but generated by ground stations using radar data.
Conflict Detection and Resolution (CD&R)
The baseline concept for conflict detection and resolution used in the 1998 human-in-the-loop experiment was the modified voltage potential, as was also used in the 1997 experiment. The modified voltage potential concept (ref.9) was chosen based on initial route, time and fuel efficiency calculations and the characteristics of the modified voltage potential (ref.2). A major benefit of the modified voltage potential is its fail safety. If two aircraft are in conflict with each other, both aircraft calculate resolutions for the conflict as if the other aircraft is not maneuvering. However, the concept assumes that both of the aircraft do maneuver, so fail safety is introduced and the conflict is solved in a cooperative and economic way. In all conflict situations, several options are available for the aircrew to resolve the conflict. Within the concept, two separate resolutions are possible which both resolve the conflict on their own. A horizontal resolution (heading and speed change) and a vertical resolution (vertical speed and altitude) are possible. The crew can choose which resolution fits best to the conflict geometry and current aircraft state. Selecting both horizontal and vertical resolution added another fail safe element to the concept. The modified voltage potential theory is shown in figure 3 . Shown in figure 3 are the ownship aircraft and an intruder aircraft. Each aircraft is protected by a protected zone of 5 nautical mile radius and a height of 2000 feet (+1000 ft, -1000 ft). The predicted protected zone of the intruder aircraft is shown in figure 3 at the time both aircraft have approached each other at minimum distance. Every predicted intrusion of a protected zone within five minutes is regarded as a conflict. The conflict detection algorithms are based on current aircraft states and do not use additional intent information. The resolution for the conflict is based on the geometry of the conflict as shown in figure 3 . The vector from the ownship's position at minimum distance to the edge of the predicted protected zone of the intruder aircraft is the avoidance vector to resolve the conflict. This avoidance vector can be divided in a heading change combined with a speed change as shown. This describes the horizontal resolution. Using the three-dimensional vector, a vertical resolution can be obtained from the conflict geometry in a similar way. 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information on Navigation Display
The traffic information is displayed on the Navigation Display (ND), roughly in the same way TCAS displays traffic today, see figure 4 . Because of the expected relative importance of vertical maneuvers a Vertical Navigation Display (VND) was integrated below the normal horizontal Navigation Display. In contrast with a normal TCAS display, different symbology was used because of the extra available information from ADS-B.
The extra information consisted of various traffic and ownship information.
As can be seen in figure 4 , the conflict and resolution geometry is presented to the aircrew similar to the definition of the modified voltage potential. This gives the aircrew an intuitive and deterministic picture of why and how to resolve a conflict. Enhanced TCAS-like symbology is used to show other traffic. The conflicting intruder aircraft is shown in amber (5 to 3 minutes away from intrusion of protected zone) or red (3 to 0 minutes from intrusion). The predicted protected zone of the intruder aircraft is shown together with a magenta avoidance vector to resolve the conflict. A dotted magenta line represents the division of the avoidance vector to heading, speed and altitude/vertical speed changes. These changes, or resolutions, are presented on the Primary Flight Display as well. 
Predictive ASAS (PASAS)
Based on the results of the 1997 experiment, ASAS should provide more protection for sudden maneuvers of aircraft nearby, causing intrusions of the protected zone. This resulted in the development of Predictive ASAS, or PASAS. PASAS calculates which tracks, speeds and vertical speeds will result in a conflict with another aircraft within 5 minutes. The results of these calculations are shown as "bands" on the Primary Flight Display and Navigation Display. In fact, PASAS generates "no-go" bands on the speed tape, the vertical speed tape and the heading/track tape. A distinction is made between potential conflicts within 0 to 3 minutes away from intrusion, displayed red, and potential conflicts between 3 and 5 minutes away from intrusion, displayed in amber. An extra rule for all pilots was introduced: pilots were not allowed to turn, climb or descend into an amber or red band. The net result is that intrusions due to sudden aircraft maneuvers nearby, like an aircraft reaching a top-of-descent, are prevented.
The Primary Flight Display (PFD) as it was used in the 1998 experiment is shown in figure 5 . The added elements to the standard Fokker 100 PFD symbology are the PASAS "no-go" zones on vertical speed, speed and heading/track tape. A Navigation Display is shown in figure 6 , with "no-go zones" on the heading/track tape. The "no-go" zones can be used pro-actively by the pilots to prevent conflicts.
Additional information on the navigation display is the distinction of aircraft equipped and aircraft not equipped with ASAS equipment. Equipped aircraft are shown in white, whereas unequipped aircraft are blue.
Airborne alerting logic
Besides the alerting on the navigation display and primary flight display, the detection of a conflict is announced to the crew aurally, with a dedicated blue light in the glareshield and resolution advisory indications on the Primary Flight Display. The displays used both color coding and aural alerts to depict threat level. The aural alerts used varied depending on the alerting level of the conflict (amber/red conflict). TCAS warnings were suppressed for experimental reasons, although TCAS is supposed to be present in this airborne separation assurance concept as a safety net.
In total, five alert zones can be identified in this concept: Aircraft within the ADS-B range of 200 nm; a 5 minutes alert zone (amber); a 3 minutes alert zone (red); the protected zone of the aircraft (5 nm radius, 2000 ft height); and, finally, the TCAS time-based Resolution Advisory zone.
ATM OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
As explained, the 1998 experiment was aimed at exploring different ATM operational concepts with Free Flight elements. Three ATM operational concepts, or scenarios have been defined, implemented and tested during the 1998 experiment. The assumption was made that equipping aircraft should be immediately beneficial to the airlines and equipping should be economy driven in stead of mandatory. Therefore, all ATM concepts were designed to benefit the equipped aircraft, without excluding the unequipped aircraft.
The means to electronically "see" the unequipped aircraft is Traffic Information Service -Broadcast (TIS-B) rather than ADS-B. TIS-B assumes a ground station will uplink radar data of the unequipped aircraft in the same format as ADS-B does.
Division by Flight Level
In this condition, the airspace above a certain altitude (the "Lower Free Flight level") is reserved for equipped aircraft only. A transition layer just above the Lower Free Flight level is used as a buffer zone for aircraft transitioning to and from Free Flight, see figure 7. This buffer zone is employed to avoid predicted conflicts and possible intrusions of protected zones between free flying and controlled aircraft if only a single Free Flight Level would be used. Flying high has a clear economic advantage for cruising aircraft. Another advantage of this method is that it allows a gradual transition to free flight by lowering the altitude limit, similar to the National Route Program in the US.
Division by Protected Airways
In this concept, the airspace structure remains largely intact. Airways are still present for controlled, unequipped aircraft. The ASAS equipped aircraft, however, have the right to leave the airways for direct shortcuts to their destinations, whereas the controlled aircraft have to stay within the airways. Free Flying aircraft have the right to cross an airway but only if they ensure conflict-free passage. The advantage of ASAS equipage is direct routing, depending however on the efficiency of the conventional airway structure. This operational concept is illustrated in figure 8. 
Fully Mixed Condition
In this case, all aircraft are able to fly direct routing. The controlled aircraft are monitored by the ground (ATC) using the same conflict detection module as is used in the airborne ASAS. ATC performs the conflict resolution task for the unequipped aircraft. By using a substantially longer look-ahead time for the conflict probing for the unequipped aircraft, these aircraft will always avoid ASAS equipped aircraft without a need for the equipped aircraft to maneuver. This is clearly beneficial for the equipped aircraft. If all works as intended, the equipped aircraft will never detect a conflict with an unequipped aircraft because this will be resolved before it will be in the look-ahead time of the ASAS equipped aircraft.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SCENARIOS
A 2x2x3 within-subjects design varied the following three factors:
 Traffic Density -low density versus high density.  Equipage -25% versus 75% ASAS equipped  ATM operational concept (or ATC condition) -Flight Level, Protected Airways and Full Mix.
The high traffic density, Flight Level ATM condition was excluded from the airborne side as preliminary testing revealed them to be too difficult for the experiment controller to handle. A total of ten test sessions were run per subject pilot, lasting twenty to thirty minutes each. Including briefing, familiarization, training, experimental runs, breaks, and debriefing, the entire protocol required two full working days per subject. The pilots were asked to fly an ASAS equipped aircraft on a preprogrammed Flight Management System (FMS) route and to be responsible for the separation with other aircraft.
RESULTS

INTRODUCTION
The results of the 1998 experiment are currently being analyzed. The initial results presented in this paper concern pilot subjective workload, pilot objective workload and pilot subjective acceptability and safety. At the end of this section, the results from the 1998 ground experiment are referenced and compared with the 1998 airborne experiment results. Main effects and two-way interactions of the different experimental variables are presented on the workload data. The mentioned pvalues represent the probability of incorrectly accepting a result as valid. Statistical significance was defined, by standard convention, as p < 0.05.
PILOT SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD
Subjective workload has been investigated with questionnaires using the Rating Scale of Mental Effort (RSME). An ATC condition main effect trend (p=0.09) indicates that workload was lowest under Full Mixed, and highest under Flight Level condition, see figure 9 . The RSME figures are normalized to Z scores to control for individual differences. PILOT OBJECTIVE WORKLOAD Visual scanning randomness, or entropy (as the term is used in thermodynamics, to describe the amount of disorder present in a system) has been used to describe the randomness present in the visual scan of the subject pilots, see also ref.10. The rationale behind the use of the entropy measure is that visual scan patterns become more stereotype (less random) with mental loading, so entropy should decrease with task load. The following data are based on entropy rate, which is entropy corrected for dwell time, and which is thought to be a more reliable measure than entropy.
Scan randomness showed a significant two-way interaction between ATC condition and equipage (p<0.05). As shown in figure 11 , the equipage effect appeared strongest for the Protected Airways condition. Figure 11 indicates that increased equipage increases pilot workload in the Flight Level and Full Mix condition, though more in the Flight Level condition. In the Protected Airways condition, lower equipage was associated with higher workload. This is completely in line with the two-way interaction subjective data shown in figure 10 . No other effects reached the required significance, although trends are also presented for the flightcrew main effect of ATC condition, see figure 12 . This figure indicates that the Full Mixed condition has the lowest and the Protected Airways the highest workload. This is reasonably in line with the subjective findings where the Full Mixed condition also has the lowest workload. Recall that indicated workload varies inversely with entropy rate. As entropy rate increases, indicated workload decreases.
E Q U I P A G E 2 5 % E Q U I P A G E 7 5 % P lo t o f M e a n s 2 -w a y in t e r a c t io n PILOT SUBJECTIVE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY DATA The subject pilots were given an acceptability questionnaire with the following scale:
"Perfect in every way" = "5"; "Favourable" = "4"; "Acceptable" = "3"; "Unacceptable" = "2"; "Completely unacceptable" = "1". Figure 13 shows the average subjective acceptability rating as a function of traffic density, equipage and ATC condition. The high traffic density, Flight Level ATM condition was excluded, as preliminary testing revealed them to be too difficult for controllers and the experiment leader. Figure 13 : Pilot subjective acceptability. Figure 13 shows the average acceptability ratings across the three ATC conditions. In all cases, except the low density Flight Level condition, the average rating was above 3, indicating acceptable or better. Especially the results of the Full Mixed condition confirm the subjective acceptability results from the 1997 human-in-the-loop experiment, see ref.11 -15. From the equipped flightdeck perspective, the Full Mixed ATC condition is considered to be closest to a 100% equipped FFAS, as tested in the 1997 experiment. The fact that the data is well above 3 for the Full Mixed ATC condition can be explained by the introduction of Predictive ASAS.
The subject pilots were given a safety questionnaire with the following scale:
"FF much safer" = "5"; "FF safer" = "4"; "same as ATC" = "3"; "ATC safer" = "2"; "ATC much safer" = "1". Figure 14 shows the average subjective safety rating as a function of traffic density, equipage and ATC condition. Figure 14 shows that the average safety ratings across the three ATC conditions are all above 3, indicating "as safe as current day ATC or better". This confirms the subjective safety results from the 1997 human-in-theloop experiment.
SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD, CONTROLLERS VERSUS PILOTS
As the air traffic controllers were unable to handle the airborne high density scenarios during tests, the ground side used the airborne low traffic density scenarios as high, and lower density scenarios as ground lows. Except from traffic density differences, the ground side used the same ASAS equipage levels and the same ATC conditions. The responses of flightdeck and ATC subjects during the 1998 airborne experiment as described in this paper and the 1998 ground experiment as described in ref.16, could therefore directly be compared.
A significant two-way interaction (p=0.007) between equipage and ATC condition for the ATC controller's workload, see ref.
16, shows that the Protected Airways ATC condition is sensitive to equipage level, see figure  15 . The Flight Level ATC condition is most optimal from an Air Traffic Controller's workload perspective. 
CONCLUSION
The subjective acceptability and safety data confirms the earlier findings from the 1997 simulation experiment, stating that a future Free Flight with Airborne Separation Assurance concept cannot be refuted. Especially the data on the Full Mixed ATC condition confirm the 1997 results as the Full Mixed ATC condition is conceptually nearest to a 100% equipped Free Flight Airspace, from the flightdeck perspective.
From the pilot subjective workload figures, it can be concluded that pilot workload depends highly on the ATM condition. Workload was reported highest under the Flight Level ATM scenario and lowest under the Full Mixed ATC condition. The equipage level affects workload only in the Protected Airways ATM condition. Low equipage has a negative effect on perceived workload in the equipped aircraft in the Protected Airways condition. The objective workload data confirms this.
Based on both the subjective and objective workload data, the Protected Airways ATM condition is considered to be less optimal. One potential problem with the Protected Airways ATM scenario is the unpredictable behavior of unequipped aircraft. Unequipped aircraft are following the airways and turning at waypoints, climbing to Top of Climbs and descending at Top of Descents, without considering the equipped aircraft. The equipped aircraft are Predictive ASAS equipped and will not turn, climb or descent into a short term conflict.
From the subjective workload data, the Full Mixed ATM scenario seems the most appropriate, confirmed by the objective workload data. Based on the findings of the 1998 ground experiment, the Flight Level ATM scenario seems the best ATM scenario for transitioning towards Free Flight.
From the airborne workload results it can be concluded that a mix of equipped and unequipped aircraft, with responsibility for separation assurance in the air and on the ground, respectively, in the same physical airspace, does not seem a problem as long as all aircraft obey the same "rules". Leaving the current ATM system partially intact, either by using protected airways or a distinct flight level separation does not necessarily assure a smooth transition towards Free Flight.
A separate result from the 1998 experiment, although not expressed in the data, is the fact that the flightdeck crew was able to handle higher traffic densities in general. This can be explained by the central (controller) versus distributed (pilot) nature of the traffic separation assurance process.
In general, it can be concluded that the future ATM design has to be chosen very carefully, as workload figures show large dependency on the ATM scenarios.
Data analysis is ongoing and additional experimental measures are yet to be analyzed. Near future plans are to verify the assumptions made in the previous experiments. For this reason, a "multi-pilot and multicontroller in the loop" experiment is planned using Internet gaming facilities. Flight tests are in preparation and work is in progress on the integration of traffic, weather and terrain information in the cockpit.
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